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Non-technical Summary
Due to outcome uncertainty of R&D investments, it is a-priori unclear whether innovative
activity leads to improved firm performance. The market value model represents a possibility
to measure the returns to innovation by relating the valuation of firms at the stock market to
R&D investment. The market value model has the advantage of bundling information and
expectations concerning future firm values. It has the disadvantage that only a minority of
companies can be used for this empirical test, as only a small share of firms in the business
sector universe are publicly traded at stock markets.
As a complement to the market value approach, we propose the use of credit ratings which are
available for almost every company. Credit ratings are not only based on current but also on
future profits, as in many cases borrowers and other remittees have long-run connections to a
firm in question. In addition, we use the future payment behavior as a variable describing
default risk. Payment behavior is classified according to the average duration until payments
are actually conducted. This variable ranges from "payments always being in time" to the
worst possible scenario, which is bankruptcy.
The major purpose of this study is a comparison of R&D in Western and Eastern German
firms with respect to its relationship to our proxy variables for financial returns. It turns out
that investing in R&D is good for Western German firms and bad for East-German firms.
While R&D contributes positively to future ratings in the West, the opposite is true in the
East. Apparently the effect of risk when investing in R&D outweighs the potential benefits. If
the receipt of subsidies is taken into account, R&D still influences ratings positively in the
West. In Eastern Germany, R&D is at least not negatively affecting the credit rating, when
firms obtain public money for such investments.
As a further step, we analyze future financial distress in order to test whether Eastern German
companies are simply discriminated by the rating agency, or if they indeed face higher risk of
bankcruptcy or defaults when engaging in R&D. The results show that Eastern German firms
seem to have significantly more difficulties to translate R&D into viable products or cost-
reducing processes. If R&D is conducted, they suffer higher likelihood of future financial
distress and finally bankruptcy. In the case of subsidized R&D, we do not witness this
negative effect.
In conclusion, we find that R&D has very different effects in Eastern and Western German
companies. While R&D improves firm performance in the West, on average, every single unit
of R&D conducted in the East reduces future firm performance. Although the negative effect
in the East is not found, when looking at R&D-subsidized firms, such investment seem not to
pay-off for the Eastern German business sector. While R&D in subsidized Western German
firms has also positive effects on future ratings and financial situation, there is no impact in
the East.
These results call into question the high subsidization of Eastern German firms. If the
resources are inefficiently used, policy makers should think about alternative ways to improve
the competitiveness of the Eastern German business sector.
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We estimate the effects of R&D on firms' credit ratings and on
financial distress. The main purpose is the comparison of firms in
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ratings in Western Germany, but a negative impact in Eastern
Germany. We also consider future financial distress, and find that
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11 Introduction
The relationship between innovation and economic return is frequently discussed in economic
literature. Among others, one approach is to relate the valuation by financial markets of a
firm's assets to measures of innovation (see Griliches, 1981, as seminal paper, or Czarnitzki et
al., 2006, for a recent survey). The market value model utilizes the evaluation by the stock
market and is therefore characterized by a bundling of information and expectations.
Additionally, this approach has advantages over the analysis of profits or productivity growth.
Firstly, the financial market valuation avoids the problems of time lags between cost and
revenues. Secondly, it is capable of forward-looking evaluation and, finally, one can compare
the economic impact of various measures of innovation.2
The disadvantage of the market approach is that it is "[...] intrinsically limited in scope,
because it can be used only for private firms and only where these firms are traded on a well
functioning financial market [...]" (Hall, 2000, p. 177). The vast majority of companies are not
publicly traded. Furthermore, such a sample is hardly representative – especially for
continential Europe – because usually only large firms are traded at the stock exchange.
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) proposed a complementary approach: the evaluation by a credit
rating agency. Ratings are clearly important for most firms in an economy, and therefore the
number of firms which could be analyzed is much larger than if only publicly traded
companies are considered, and it is also representative for the economy as a whole. Credit
ratings are associated with the market’s assessment of future profits, but not directly. They are
primarily driven by evaluation of default risk on various forms of debt, which has mostly to
do with the firm’s cost of capital, structure of the balance sheet and variance of cash flow.3
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) have shown for a sample of Western German manufacturing
firms that various measures of innovative activity are positively related with firms’ credit
ratings over a large range of the distribution of innovative activity. If, however, innovative
activity exceeds a certain threshold level, such companies are downgraded, maybe because
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3 Against the background of the New Basle Capital Accord, the relevance of such ratings will even increase in
the future (cf. e.g. Secretariat of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001).
2their business strategy relies heavily on risky projects. For example, Czarnitzki and Kraft
found that – while controlling for several other factors – R&D is positively correlated with
credit ratings up to an intensity (R&D/Sales) of 14%. Firms that show a higher R&D intensity
are rated more conservatively due to the inherent risk of failure their investment strategy
faces.
The purpose of this paper has two dimensions: On one hand, we apply the approach
introduced by Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) to a sample of Eastern German manufacturing
firms, and, on the other hand, we extend the rating model by a second equation dealing with
financial distress and bankruptcy. This is particularly interesting for two reasons: first, Eastern
German manufacturing is predominantly composed of small and medium-sized enterprises
that were newly founded after the German re-unification in 1990. The vast majority is not
publicly traded. We ask the question whether investment in R&D is valued as in Western
Germany, or if agencies rate such firms more conservative, because young firms lack a
corresponding track record on which the rating could be based. Second, innovation in a
transition economy like Eastern Germany might suffer from lacking experience with both the
current technological frontier and mechanisms at place in a market economy. For example,
outdated human capital could often leads to duplicate research (by accident), or firms could
rely only on imitation (on purpose). In combination with high demand uncertainty and lacking
experience in marketing strategy, investments in R&D may not lead to (expected) returns.
Those could be necessary to survive for start-up firms.
Furthermore, this study could be highly relevant for innovation policy. Eastern German firms
receive relatively more subsidies than their Western German counterparts. The German
government intends to foster the transformation process from a planned economy to a viable
market economy by, among other policies, an intensive support for innovative activities in
order to strenghten the competitiveness of the Eastern German regions. If, however,
innovation activities in the East do not lead to successful products and market success, but fail
or, in the worst case, put firms at the risk of bankruptcy, this policy strategy may be an
inefficient allocation of resources. Consequently, we will analyze both subsidized and non-
subsidized firms.
Our study is an extension of the (few) existing studies on the effects of innovations in
transition economies. Aghion et al. (2002) as well as Carlin et al. (2004) investigate the effect
of innovations on growth of a sample of 2,245 respectively 3,288 firms from 24 Eastern
European countries. The main emphasis is on the interaction of competition and innovation. It
3is found that some competitive pressure is good for innovativeness, but too much can be
counterproductive (Carlin et al., 2004). Innovativeness has a positive impact on growth.
However, it is not tested whether innovations have also a positive effect on profitability.
Konings and Xavier (2002) utilize information concerning innovation and use the ratio of
intangible assets to total fixed assets as an exogenous variable explaining survival and growth
for a sample of 2,813 Slovanian firms over the time period from 1994 to 1998. It turns out
that the innovation variable has negative, yet insignificant, coefficients both in the growth and
the survival equations. However, this is a first indication that innovation might not support
growth and survival of firms in a transition economy. This stands in contrast to the usual
empirical results estimated for firms in non-transition countries (Hall, 1987, Cefis and
Marsili, 2006). We are not aware of a study that directly compares non-transition and
transition countries.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the conceptual background,
Section 3 describes the data, and the econometric study is presented in Section 4. The final
section concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
The advantage of using ratings is that almost every firm which is looking for either bank loans
or supplier credits is classified. The data basis is much broader and a selectivity effect, if still
present at all, is clearly smaller than if only publicly traded, joint-stock companies are
considered. Similarly to the studies based on stock market evaluation of firm values,
accounting practices do not distort the rating and lags are of minor importance.4 The
disadvantage is that whilst thousands of participants evaluate a firm’s value in the stock
market, here it is done by a single rating agency.
The firm value is expected to reflect the value of both tangible assets and intangible assets, in
particular the stock of innovative knowledge, i.e. the intangible assets created by R&D
activity. The effect of innovative activity on the rating of a firm might be ambiguous. A rating
takes into account business and financial risks, such as industry characteristics, competitive
position, management, productivity, profitability, liquidity as well as financial policy and
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4flexibility. Thus a rating reflects both currently observable firm characteristics and
expectations regarding future developments.
The statement that innovative activity is a risky undertaking is close to triviality. Risk is
expected to affect the rating negatively, as the lender faces a higher probability of failure.
However, innovation is a driving force for economic success and therefore an innovative firm
may achieve a good rating. There might well be an internal optimum which means that
“some“ R&D is useful, whilst too much R&D does not maximize the present firm value. Thus
a 'moderately' successfully R&D performing firm is expected to have high revenues and a
good financial performance. Although R&D does not influence the rating directly, a rating
agency could indirectly react to innovative activity because of the economic success (or
failure).
The effect of R&D on credit ratings is a priori unclear. Given the aim of the rating agency to
evaluate the probability of defaults, any risk should be negatively valued. However, without
any innovative effort a firm will loose market share and its competitiveness will suffer. In the
long run an innovative firm may have better chances to survive, if investments into these
activities are not too large.
Aside of the general relevance of evaluating the effect of R&D activity on ratings, it is of
specific interest in the case of Eastern Germany. We are able to compare the market economy
of Western Germany with an economy in transition where both have the same currency unit,
the same legal system, the same economic system and all other important contributions to the
business environment. It should be noted, though, that more than 15 years after the
unification, wages are still lower in Eastern Germany, on average.
After the German reunification in 1990, the East German industrial sector more or less
collapsed. The existing larger firms (the "combinates") were sold to new (private) owners and
a restructuring process took place. In order to speed up the convergence process, a number of
policy measures were introduced. Those covered the whole range of taks: improving
infrastucture, active labor market policies, and also support targeted on private firms, like
investment and innovation programs.
Fostering innovation is clearly intended to improve the competitiveness of the companies in
question and this was highly needed for the former producers in a centrally governed planning
society. In order to be a successful stimulus to the catching-up process, the subsidies must be
used efficiently within the firm. Necessary conditions are, among others, a skilled workforce
5and an efficient organization system. It is unclear whether the East German firms succeeded
in building up an effective production system in order to allocate scarce resources in general
and innovative assets in specific. The East German companies used to be run by pursuing
very different principles than those relevant for a capitalistic economy with darwinistic
structures. A comparison of the performance of today's Western and Eastern German firms
seems to be an interesting test on the question whether the firms in the East and the West
behave similar and whether the subsidies are efficiently used or not. Our idea to consider the
impact of innovative assets on credit ratings of the Eastern German firms is of particular use
as most of them are small privately owned businesses that are rarely quoted at the stock
exchange market.
The approach is in our view also a useful extension of the earlier research concerning the
possible substitutionability of publicly financed R&D (cf. Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003,
Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). While this kind of research examines the impact of public
subsidies on the total R&D budget, our present approach tests on the effectiveness of R&D.
Non-substitution between private R&D and public subsidies is a necessary condition for
effectiveness. In addition, a productive use of these resources is needed in order to achieve an
efficient allocation of scarce tax financed public expenditures.
As mentioned above, credit ratings are constructed in order to assess possible default risk for
potential investors. Although this may well be used as a performance indicator of businesses,
this measure is different from a market value. Therefore, we investigate in a second step of
our analysis whether the results we find with respect to the rating are also reflected in other
performance indicators. Since Eastern German firms are, on average, much younger and
smaller than Western German firms, they face higher market uncertainty. This could result in
more conservative ratings simply due to lacking track records and experience with such
businesses.
In order to assess a potential downward bias for non-economically motivated reasons by the
rating agency, we verify our finding on the credit rating by an estimation of a second
equation. As an alternative to the rating, we consider the risk of financial distress. Although
we observe actual bankcruptcy, too, we prefer to use a broader measure of financial distress,
because firm bankruptcies are rare events, and the econometric analysis of such is difficult.
Financial distress is described by the payment behavior of firms. A default is certainly an
incidence that a lender definitely wants to avoid, but late payments are also a problem and
usually related to financial losses and, in addition, it may be a warning that more serious
6problems could arise in the near future. Therefore, we believe that payment behavior is an
objective measure concerning the risk of borrowers or other remittees, and that it directly
translates into liquidity of firms.
Our variable characterizing the financial situation takes on six different categories, which
describe the payment behavior (or liquidity): the best is the observation that the firm under
consideration usually pays its bills before they are due in oder to realize a discount. The
categories in-between refer to payment of bills "within the term of credit" through "regularly
long delays" in payments, and the worst category is bankruptcy. This variable shows more
variation than a dummy variable indicating bankruptcy only. If we find that the effect of R&D
on the payment behavior (called "financial distress" henceforth) is different from that on the
rating, the agency would actually discriminate Eastern German firms and possibly hamper
their access to external capital unwarrentedly. If, however, R&D shows a similar effect on
financial distress, the rating agency anticipates R&D outcome Eastern German firms
correctly, on average. In this case, R&D projects in Eastern German firms either fail to a large
extent or such companies miss to utilize R&D results at the market. With respect to the East-
West comparison, our analysis allows to conclude the following: if there is no difference to be
found, both types of firms show the same level of efficiency, when dealing with innovation
resources. If they are dissimilar, however, the use of innovative assets is of higher value in
one region of the country than it is in the other.
Consequently, we estimate two equations: first we consider the market value equation
represented by the credit rating (RATING), and, second, we investigate the effect of R&D on
the future firm performance in terms of financial distress (DISTRESS):
( ), 1   ,  i t it itRATING f RDINT X+ = , (1)
( ), 1 ,i t it itDISTRESS g RDINT X+ = (2)
where RDINT is the R&D intensity (R&D/SALES) of firm i in period t, and X represents a
vector of covariates to be described below.
3 Data
The data basis for our research is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which is an annual
German innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
since 1992. We use data from 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 on German manufacturing firms, as
those waves of the panel include questions on the receipt of R&D subsidies. The information
from the MIP is merged with the database of "Creditreform" which is the largest German
7rating agency. This database contains a credit rating and related data of most firms in
Germany. The resulting sample after merging the two databases comprises 3,167 observations
on Western German firms and 1,158 on Eastern German firms. Note that we do not have a
panel dataset in the econometric sense. About 60% of the firms in both regions are only
observed once in the sample. This is partly due to the merging of both databases, but also due
to the fact that German firms are reluctant to provide information about their enterprises
voluntarily. A considerable share of firms does not participate regularly in the MIP survey,
and hence we can only conduct a pooled cross-sectional analysis, but not make use of panel
data econometrics (see Table 6 in the appendix for information on the panel structure).
As described above, we choose firms' credit ratings as a market performance indicator and
relate it to innovative activity. The credit rating is an index which ranges from zero to 500,
where 500 represents the best rating.5 However, Creditreform interprets this rating score not
as a linear index, but as an ordered variable with 5 categories:
1) insufficient, 2) weak, 3) average, 4) good, 5) very good.
Thus, our dependent variable takes values from zero to four and is specified as a one-period
lead (RATINGi,t+1). The lead is used to ensure that the causality runs from innovation to the
rating. Moreover, the rating agency may need some time to react to changes in firm activities.
The distribution of ratings is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Distribution of ratings in the sample
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Rating category # of obs. in % # of obs. in %
Insufficient 35 1.08 35 3.04
Weak 65 2.01 52 4.51
Average 1,243 38.38 875 75.89
Good 1,678 51.81 188 16.31
Very good 218 6.73 3 0.26
Total 3,239 100.00 1,153 100.00
It turns out that only a few firms in the sample have weak or insufficient ratings. This may be
due to a firm size restriction in the survey. Firms are only sampled if they have at least five
employees. Table 1 shows clearly, however, that Eastern German firms have worse ratings
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8than Western German firms, on average. While almost 8% of Eastern German firms have a
weak or worse rating, this applies only to about 3% in the West. Whereas almost 60% of
Western German firms have a good or very good rating, this is only the case for less than 17%
of Eastern German firms.
The second dependent variable is financial distress in period t+1 which is described by the
payment behaviour of firms (DISTRESSi,t+1). This variable is also categorial and is defined as
follows:
0) early payments in order to utilize discount
1) payments within term of credit
2) payment mostly within term of credit
3) several incidents of late payments
4) regularly late payments; payments only after (several) dunning letters
5) insolvency (bankcruptcy)
The distribution of this financial distress measure is shown in Table 2. The frequency
distribution in the East and West differ mainly in the good categories. While 46% of Western
German firms are located in the best category of earliest payments, the Eastern German
proportion in this class is only about 11%. The vast majority of firms in Eastern Germany
show payment within the term of credits, though. However, the relative frequency of
insolvency in the East is more than twice as high than in the West.
Table 2: Distribution of financial distress (payment behavior) in the sample
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Payment category # of obs. in % # of obs. in %
Early payments in order to utilize discount 1,484 45.82 129 11.19
Payments within term of credit 1,444 44.58 809 70.16
Payment mostly within term of credit 179 5.53 116 10.06
Several incidents of late payments 48 1.48 31 2.69
Regularly late payments; payments only
after (repeated) dunning letters 4 0.12 5 0.43
Insolvency (bankcruptcy) 80 2.47 63 5.46
Total 3,239 100.00 1,153 100.00
The exogeneous variable of our main interest is R&D intensity which is measured as R&D
expenditure divided by sales (RDINT = R&D/SALES * 100). We also test quadratic functional
forms of R&D intensity, because there might well be an internal optimum. Two issues should
be noted about this variable:
9• In market value studies, scholars usually intend to measure the knowledge stock
calculated by R&D or patents through the perpetual inventory method from a time series
of annual expenditures or patents. In our case, we do not have the information necessary
to do so. Therefore, we only consider current R&D expenditure. Due to the high
adjustment cost of R&D activities, the current expenditure is expected to represent a good
proxy-variable for the R&D stock.
• In the second equation on financial distress, current expenditure is actually what we
consider as the relevant measure. Current expenses will have a direct effect on future
liquidity. Using a one-year lead of the dependent variable also avoids endogeneity
problems of current R&D.
As we are especially interested in differences among regions, we use a dummy variable
identifying Eastern German firms (EAST), and consider two interaction terms of R&D to
allow for differences in the impact of R&D on our dependent variables:
RDINT_WEST = (1 – EAST) * RDINT, and
RDINT_EAST = EAST * RDINT.
Furthermore, the rating may be affected by other factors besides innovativeness. We include
several control variables: Firm age is an important variable as, for young firms, the rating may
also indicate the likelihood of survival, and not only economic wealth. Moreover, lacking
track record may yield worse ratings. This is particularly important in our context, because the
Western German firms are located in an established market economy and some of them may
be very old. In contrast, the vast majority of Eastern German firms has been newly founded
after the German re-unification in 1990. We distinguish four age groups in the analysis: firms
being older than 15 years are considered as old firms in the context of our East-West
comparison. As we will highlight in the upcoming econometric exercise, such firms are very
different from the younger (Eastern German) firms, and we will present estimations for
subsamples of younger firms separately. The other three age groups concern firms from 1 to
5, 6-10 and 11-15 years in business.
As significant as the age difference in the two parts of Germany is the innovation policy.
Since the re-unification firms in Eastern Germany are heavily subsidized in order to accelerate
the catching-up process to the West. Since the emphasis in this study is on R&D activities and
their contribution to firm performance, we take public R&D subsidies into account. We found
that it is critically important to split the sample into subsidized and non-subsidized firms. This
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is done by a dummy variable that indicates whether a companies has received subsidies in the
corresponding period.
Other controls are total sales volume (SALES) and its squared value (in billion DM) to control
for size effects. Sales are used instead of physical assets, because this is in line with the
construction of the rating, in our case. The sales per employee (in million DM) controls for
productivity differences among firms (SALES/EMP). We have also experimented with
different liability-limiting legal forms, and include a dummy for joint stock companies
(JSTOCK), and one for other liability-limiting legal forms (LTD). In addition, firms that are
associated with a group may have better access to capital than stand-alone companies, and
thus we include a dummy variable for such firms (GROUP). Twelve industry dummies
capture sectoral differences and three time dummies shift intertemporal changes. Descriptive
statistics of the variables used (except time and industry dummies) are given in Table 3.
On average, Eastern German firms show a higher R&D intensity (2.6%) than Western
German firms (1.7%), but this is not due to higher R&D investment, but less sales on average.
The average Western German firm employs 436 people (median: 156), while this figure
amounts to 129 (median: 62) in the East. Furthermore, Western German firms achieve higher
sales per employee (the median of sales per employee is 0.23 in the West vs. 014 in the East),
and are more likely to be associated with a group (39% versus 30% in the East).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Western Germany (N = 3,239)
RATING i,t+1 2.611 0.691 0 4
DISTRESS i,t+1 0.729 0.952 0 5
RDINTit (=R&D/SALES*100) 1.678 3.390 0 59.559
D(R&D Subsidy received)it 0.172 0.377 0 1
SALESit (in billion DM) 0.126 0.321 0.0004 4.292
SALES/EMPit (in million DM) 0.277 0.188 0.042 1.634
Employees in 1,000s (EMPit) 0.436 1.188 0.002 28.4
D(AGE = 1–5 years) it 0.068 0.252 0 1
D(AGE = 6–10 years) it 0.103 0.303 0 1
D(AGE = 11–15 years) it 0.093 0.291 0 1
D(AGE = more than 15 years) it 0.736 0.441 0 1
JSTOCKit 0.057 0.232 0 1
LTDit 0.881 0.324 0 1
GROUPit 0.385 0.487 0 1
Eastern Germany (N = 1,153)
RATING i,t+1 2.062 0.580 0 4
DISTRESS i,t+1 1.274 1.077 0 5
RDINTit (=R&D/SALES*100) 2.613 6.350 0 69.601
D(R&D Subsidy received)it 0.442 0.497 0 1
SALESit (in billion DM) 0.033 0.139 0.0004 3.311
SALES/EMPit (in million DM) 0.187 0.158 0.035 1.609
Employees in 1,000s (EMPit) 0.129 0.304 0.002 7.832
D(AGE = 1–5 years) 0.430 0.495 0 1
D(AGE = 6–10 years) 0.485 0.500 0 1
D(AGE = 11–15 years) 0.009 0.093 0 1
D(AGE = more than 15 years) 0.076 0.266 0 1
JSTOCKit 0.014 0.117 0 1
LTDit 0.917 0.276 0 1
GROUPit 0.303 0.460 0 1
Another major difference is the age of businesses: In the West, the majority of firms is more
than 15 years in business (73%), while 92% of the Eastern German firms are younger than 15
years. This is, of course, caused by the German re-unification in 1990. The Government's
efforts of forstering the transformation process of the Eastern German economy is clearly
reflected in the level of R&D subsidies: in the West, 17% of manufacturing firms in the
sample have received R&D subsidies. In Eastern Germany, however, this figure amounts
44%. If one only considers R&D-performing firms this difference becomes even more
striking: in the West 58% (= 1,868 obs.) and in the East 54% (= 624 obs.) of firms conduct
R&D. However, in the West only 28% (= 530 obs.) of such are subsidized with respect to
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their R&D activities, whereas 75% (= 471 obs.) of Eastern German R&D performers received
public funding.
4 Regression results
As the previous section outlined, there are some fundamental differences between the two
German regions. First, Eastern German firms are much younger than those in the West, on
average. Second, there is a large difference in the supply of public R&D funding among the
East and West. These facts led to following estimation strategy: as the dependent variables in
our study indicate financial performance and we are interested in the relationship to R&D
activities, we split the sample into subsidized and non-subsidized firms. R&D in firms that are
not subsidized may be different from that in non-supported firms: on one hand, firms that use
only their own funds may have a project portfolio with higher expected private return as the
government aims to pick those projects for subsidization that show a high expected social
return, but not necessarily a high private return. This would be in line with the theory on
external effects introduced by Arrow (1962) according to which any R&D activity creates
knowledge spill-overs. As a result, the firm cannot appropriate the full returns from its
knowledge creation, but third parties and in the end society benefits from such investments. In
turn, there may be projects that have very high social returns, but the private returns do not
cover the private cost. A profit-maximizing firm will surely choose only those projects with
highest expected private return, and the government aims to pick such projects for public
support that do not cover the private cost. Hence, projects is subsidized firms may generate
less private profit, on average. On the other hand, the subsidized firms undertake research not
with their own funds, at least partly. Thus, failures of projects may not have such a negative
impact on the financial situation as they might have in firms that use only their own funds
(see Hall, 2002, for a survey on financing constraints, and Czarnitzki, 2006, for a recent study
on financing of R&D in Eastern and Western Germany).
The large difference in age of firms leads to an estimation using the full sample where we
control for age by using three dummy variables. Furthermore, we consider subsamples of
firms younger than 16 years.
4.1 Innovative activity and credit ratings
We first present the regression results on the "market value" equation as outlined in Section 2
for both Eastern and Western Germany. The specification is based on Czarnitzki and Kraft
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(2004) who performed the same regressions with a similar dataset for Western German
companies. The regressions are Ordered Probit models with known threshold values. Recall
that the credit rating is originally an index between 0 and 500 which is only categorized for
better interpretation. Use of the true threshold values allows us to identify the variance of the
model (and the constant term). In such a case, the estimated coefficients can be directly
interpreted as coefficients in a linear regression model, i.e. as marginal effects in the "true"
latent model.6 The four models correspond to different samples:
A) Full sample of firms that did not receive an R&D subsidy; 
B) Subsample of firms that did not receive R&D subsidies and that are less than 16 years in
 business;
C) Full sample of firms that received R&D subsidies;
D) Subsample of firms that received R&D subsidies and that are less then 16 years in
 business.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. First, we discuss model A: as in the earlier
study, we find that R&D has a non-linear impact on the future ratings of Western German
firms. The relationship is inversely u-shaped and the curve peaks at 8.2% of R&D intensity.
Thus, for the most part of the distribution (more than 97% of observations), R&D has a
positive impact on firm performance measured by the credit rating. Only if firms engage in
R&D largely (beyond 8.2% R&D intensity) they are perceived as risky investment
opportunities by the rating agency, so that such firms are evaluated more conservatively. For
the Eastern German firms, however, the relationship between future ratings and R&D is
completely different: we did not find any non-linearity, but a negative linear correlation. As
soon as Eastern German companies perform R&D they are downgraded, because the
perceived risk of financial distress or even bankrupty outweighs the potentially positive
benefits of R&D. A change from zero to 10% of R&D intensity would reduce the rating index
by almost 23 points, on average. Beyond the effect of R&D, it turns out that Eastern German
firms ceteris paribus achieve worse ratings than firms in the West. On average, the rating
index of Eastern German firms is 21.3 points lower.
                                                
6 Verbeek (2000, pp. 192-4) provides a good example of the Ordered Probit model for this case.
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Furthermore, we do not find unexpected results, since the other covariates are already
explicitly taken into account in the construction of ratings by the agency: firms that are
associated with a group achieve better ratings. On average, such firms obtain an 11-points
higher rating index than stand-alone companies. The interaction term between GROUP and
EAST does not yield a difference among regions. As hypothesized, younger firms are more
conservatively rated than more established firms. The three dummies indicating firms
between 1-5, 6-10 and 11-15 years in business are significantly negative (reference category
are firms that are longer than 15 years in business). Wald tests show that the youngest firms
(1-5 years) are significantly rated worse than the other categories, but that there is no
significant difference among firms that are between 6-10 and 11-15 years old. Sales increase
the ratings. Not surprisingly the quadratic specification shows a decreasing effect with
increasing size. In line with sales, the value added per employee has a positive effect on future
ratings. The legal form dummies are (jointly) insignificant.
Model B only considers the subsample of firms that are less than 16 years in business and that
did not receive R&D subsidies. This specification has been motivated by the fact that the vast
majority of firms in Eastern Germany has been newly founded since the German unification
in 1990, whereas the Western German industry has many firms being much older. Therefore,
a separate regression for the subsample of younger firms is worth to investigate. There are
interesting differences in results: In contrast to model A, R&D does no longer have a positive
effect on future ratings in Western German young companies. It seems that there is more risk
involved in R&D in younger firms, such that those are not better rated than young firms
without own R&D which may reflect a less risky business strategy. However, we still find
that Eastern German firms are downgraded if they pursue risky investments like R&D. Thus,
the basic results holds: R&D in Eastern German firms is regarded as more risky than in
Western German firms. On average, Eastern German firms are generally rated worse than
Western German one (17 points). The other results are very similar to those obtained in model
A except that the GROUP dummy and the remaining two age dummies become insignificant.
There is no difference among very young and other firms that are less then 16 years in
business.
Model C only considers firms that have received R&D subsidies. In principle, we find
comparable results to the regression based on non-subsidized firms (model A). An important
difference concerns R&D activity, though: R&D is again positively valued in Western
German companies. In Eastern German firms, however, it is no longer negatively influencing
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the rating. It seems that subsidized research where firms do not risk their own money (at least
to less extent) is not regarded as critically as R&D conducted on solely own resurces.
Table 4: Ordered Probit models with known threshold values on future credit ratings
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D
RDINT_WESTit 2.256 *** 2.303 1.726 ** 1.386
(0.802) (1.538) (0.867) (2.901)
(RDINT_WESTit)2 -0.137 *** -0.126 -0.065 *** -0.114
(0.049) (0.106) (0.025) (0.137)
RDINT_EASTit -2.258 *** -2.019 *** -0.303 -0.281
(0.719) (0.729) (0.319) (0.339)
EASTi -21.270 *** -17.485 *** -22.815 *** -13.330
(3.651) (4.421) (7.355) (13.359)
SALESit 97.154 *** 116.804 *** 51.575 *** 61.697
(9.279) (18.836) (12.510) (45.956)
(SALESit)2 -29.805 *** -44.749 *** -14.582 *** -17.156
(3.505) (8.459) (3.851) (28.179)
SALES/EMPit 15.244 *** 31.475 *** 5.912 40.770
(5.482) (8.692) (14.889) (24.788)
D(AGE = 1–5 years) it -28.035 *** -5.570 -28.440 *** 10.877
(3.394) (4.763) (6.550) (11.005)
D(AGE = 6–10 years) it -18.432 *** 2.077 -24.746 *** 11.214
(2.982) (4.421) (6.316) (10.614)
D(AGE = 11–15 years) it -23.138 *** -44.699 ***
(3.576) (8.489)
JSTOCKit 9.716 5.770 15.514 -14.787
(6.131) (12.009) (11.047) (26.685)
LTDit -4.086 -3.491 0.218 -0.017
(3.677) (6.357) (9.015) (15.912)
GROUPit 11.343 *** 5.272 12.394 ** 13.994
(2.305) (4.463) (5.097) (11.803)
GROUPit * EASTi -0.847 0.177 7.172 2.896
(5.294) (6.593) (7.448) (12.968)
Intercept 408.401 *** 386.653 *** 403.665 *** 345.359 ***
(5.337) (9.811) (14.357) (25.355)




















# of obs. 3,325 1,315 1,067 604
Log-Likelihood -3,147.55 -1,152.63 -1,018.79 -548.87
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a 1% (5%,10%) significance level.
Model A) full sample of firms that did not receive an R&D subsidy; B) subsample of firms that did not receive
R&D subsidies and that are less than 16 years in business; C) full sample of firms that received R&D subsidies;
D) subsample of firms that received R&D subsidies and that are less then 16 years in business.
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Finally, model D looks at young firms that received R&D subsidies. Here, we basically find
no significant effect of any covariate on ratings except heterogeneity among industries and
time.
We also experimented with an interaction term of R&D in Eastern Germany and time. It
would have been possible that Eastern German firms improved the utilization of R&D over
time. Therefore, we checked if an interaction of R&D with the time dummy indicating the
year 2000 shows results in that respect. It turned out, however, that the interaction variable is
insignificant and that all previous results remain unchanged. Hence, there is no evidence for
substantial improvement with respect to R&D management between 1994 and 2000.
In general, the results show that R&D in Western Germany contributes positively to firm
value. If the subsample of younger firms is employed, it does not harm the ratings in the
West, but in Eastern German firms the negative risk effect of R&D outweighs its potential
benefits regarding better market positioning of firms. It seems that R&D leads to less useful
results in the East than in the West. If R&D is subsidized, that is, risk of bankruptcy should be
alleviated, we find that it is at least not downgrading firms' ratings in the East.
4.2 Innovative assets and financial distress
The negative relationship between R&D and ratings in Eastern Germany could be due to two
different reasons. Either the East-German firms are unfairly treated and become discriminated
or they are using innovative resources less efficiently. The question on the reason for the
observed difference can be investigated with data concerning future financial distress as a
(negative) outcome of business activity. As described above future financial distress is
measured by the payment behavior of firms in period t+1. The exogenous variables are the
same as in the previous estimation. We again separate the sample into groups A, B, C and D.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5. Note that a higher value of DISTRESS
corresponds to worse liquidity than a lower value.
Again, we find the same interesting effect: in Model A, R&D relates positively to payment
behavior. The estimated effect between DISTRESS and R&D is nonlinearly and negatively,
where the minimum is at 8.75% of R&D intensity. Thus, for almost all firms (about 98%)
R&D decreases the risk of bankruptcy. In Eastern Germany, R&D has the opposite effect,
though. We found a positive linear relationship between future distress and R&D. It seems
that the effect of the riskiness of the investment outweighs its potential future benefits. Thus,
Eastern German firms may have been less successful to translate R&D into viable products or
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cost-reducing processes during the 1990s, on average. Every unit spent for R&D increases the
time period needed for payment of bills. Hence the companies of the new German "Länder"
are not discriminated, they are really different from their Western counterparts. The EAST
dummy is also positive which accounts for the fact that Eastern German firms ceteris paribus
face a higher risk of bankrupty. The other control variables are similar to the first regression
on future credit ratings.
Table 5: Ordered Probit models on future financial distress
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D
RDINT_WESTit -0.035 ** -0.052 -0.042 ** 0.007
(0.017) (0.032) (0.018) (0.058)
(RDINT_WESTit)2 0.002 * 0.003 0.001 *** -0.0001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.003)
RDINT_EASTit 0.048 *** 0.048 *** 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.007)
EASTi 0.438 *** 0.506 *** 0.526 *** 0.567 **
(0.074) (0.092) (0.151) (0.269)
SALESit -0.826 *** -1.158 *** -0.392 -0.984
(0.209) (0.414) (0.272) (0.950)
(SALESit)2 0.226 *** 0.428 ** 0.126 0.226
(0.080) (0.181) (0.083) (0.582)
SALES/EMPit -0.420 *** -0.576 *** -0.154 -0.631
(0.121) (0.187) (0.313) (0.509)
D(AGE = 1–5 years) it 0.350 *** -0.135 0.532 *** -0.385 *
(0.070) (0.100) (0.134) (0.222)
D(AGE = 6–10 years) it 0.245 *** -0.197 ** 0.506 *** -0.378 *
(0.063) (0.093) (0.130) (0.213)
D(AGE = 11–15 years) it 0.438 *** 1.042 ***
(0.075) (0.173)
JSTOCKit 0.032 -0.030 0.245 0.480
(0.133) (0.258) (0.231) (0.544)
LTDit -0.133 * -0.015 -0.024 0.098
(0.077) (0.133) (0.186) (0.310)
GROUPit -0.183 *** -0.085 -0.215 ** -0.074
(0.051) (0.095) (0.109) (0.237)
GROUPit * EASTi -0.008 -0.106 -0.192 -0.346
(0.108) (0.138) (0.153) (0.261)




















# of obs. 3,325 1,315 1,067 604
Log-Likelihood -3,330.723 -1,342.400 -1,058.226 -611.339
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a 1% (5%,10%) significance level.
Model A) full sample of firms that did not receive an R&D subsidy; B) subsample of firms that did not receive
R&D subsidies and that are less than 16 years in business; C) full sample of firms that received R&D subsidies;
D) subsample of firms that received R&D subsidies and that are less then 16 years in business.
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In Model B where older firms are excluded from the sample, the results are also comparable
to the regression on the ratings. While there is no longer a positive effect of R&D in the West,
the estimated relationship for Eastern German firms is the same as in Model A. R&D leads to
longer time intervals needed for payments, and finally to higher risk of bankruptcy. Again, the
Eastern German firms are confronted with higher liquidity problems than Western German
firms ceteris paribus.
Model C and D consider firms that receive subsidies, and the results from the previous
regressions on ratings are confirmed. In the full sample, R&D leads to better payment
behavior in the future. In the East, however, there is no such effect. In the case, R&D is
subsidized, it, at least, does not exhibit a negative effect on the future financial situation of
firms. Yet, the EAST dummy indicated that Western German firms perform better than their
Eastern counterparts all else constant. This effect even persists when only the subsample of
younger firms (Model D) is used.
In summary, we argue that R&D in Eastern Germany is perceived as more risky rather than
beneficial for firm value. In the West, the opposite is true. However, the regressions on future
financial distress measured by the payment behavior (time elapsing until payment of bills)
indicate that Eastern German firms are not discriminated by the rating agency. R&D does
indeed lead to liquidity problems in the future rather than to improved successful products or
cost reductions in production. Clearly the question arises, how this provocative result is
explained. One reason is presumably the lower R&D productivity estimated by Czarnitzki and
Licht (2006). They considered the impact of (subsidized and non-subsidized) R&D on the
number of patent applications. According to their study Eastern German firms achieve only
less than 50% of the Western German productivity level. Hence the R&D management has to
be improved. More general, Czarnitzki (2005) analyzed the productivity deficiency in Eastern
Germany by using the average gap in value added between Eastern and Western German
firms. Although this gap is gradually closing over time, it remained still large in the year
2000. Furthermore, the study of Czarnitzki (2005) shows that innovating Eastern German
firms perform relatively worse than non-innovating firms when compared to a relevant
control group from the West. The productivity gap between the East and West is larger for
innovating firms than for others.
These results call into question the high subsidization of Eastern German firms. If the
resources are inefficiently used, policy makers should think about alternative ways to improve
the competitiveness of the Eastern German business sector.
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5 Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an empirical study concerning the effects of innovative
activity on credit ratings of firms. Previously, the effects of innovation have often been
investigated by market valuation of firms present at the stock market, which is a small
subsample of firms in the population. In contrast to this, the credit rating approach can be
applied to almost all firms in the economy. The credit rating approach is extended by an
objective variable concerning the financial status of firms. We use the time taken until
payment obligations are fulfilled. Although bankruptcy would be an alternative and more
stringent measure of failure, payment behavior has a larger variance than defaults and is
therefore better suited for an econometric analysis.
This paper is an extension of our earlier study, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004), with a very
different emphasis. We compare the performance of Western and Eastern German firms
which have a very different history, but are now subject to the same currency and legal
system, wage determination rules and all other important foundations of an economy. The
Western German firms have developed in a traditional market economy while, in contrast, the
Eastern German firms face the transformation process from a formerly planned economy. It is
by no means clear that both firm types behave in the same way with respect to the outcome of
R&D activity despite the common environment. However, this is the unique opportunity to
evaluate the pure “transition” effect without any confusion with specific country effects.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the Eastern German firms are very dissimilar to the Western
German ones. They perform worse. Any R&D effort leads to a lower credit rating, hence the
rating agency distrusts these firms. An examination of the payment behavior (as an indicator
for financial distress) shows that the rating agency does not discriminate Eastern German
firms with respect to ratings. Innovative activity increases future financial distress in Eastern
Germany. The firms invest in R&D without getting corresponding returns afterwards. It
remains a demanding task for future work to explain why this phenomenon occurs in Eastern
Germany. If R&D is subsidized, we find that it contributes positively to performance in the
West, but not in Eastern German firms. However, in the case of subsidy receipt, R&D does at
least not harm the economic performance in the East.
It would as well be interesting to expand the basis of our research to Eastern European
countries. According to international comparative statistics the Eastern European countries
show much less innovative activity than e.g. the EU average (cf. Aralica and Bacic, 2005).
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This might be good or bad. If the firms are not skilled enough to handle R&D processes it is
good that they recognize this. Adoption of established processes and products in connection
with product variation and competitive production possibilities are an attractive alternative to
innovation7. However most observers ask for more R&D in these countries and for policies to
ease innovation in order to increase growth (see e.g. Aralica and Bacic, 2005, as well as
Tournemine and Muller, 1996). In our view much more empirical research is needed before
such a policy recommondation can seriously be made. Preliminary results by Paasi (1998)
point to lower efficiency of the transition economies with respect to the management of
innovation.
However, those policy intervention are not only subject of theoretical discussions. Subsidies
granted by the European Commission in member countries, like the sixth framework program,
are also relevant for the accession countries of the European Union. Perhaps R&D subsidies
are partly wasted if granted in an early stage of the transformation process and could be used
in a more productive way. It might be the case that instead of conducting research and
development firms in these areas are better off by the production of established products at
lower costs than in the Western countries. The answers to these questions would surely be
helpful for the policy design for transformation processes.
Another interesting extension of this research would disentagle R&D into original research
and research mainly aiming at imitation of existing products in established markets. On the
one hand, Eastern German firms could mainly focus on imitation which would possibly
explain the less successful outcome of R&D in such firms. On the other hand, they may well
come up with market novelties, but those may either lack sufficient demand or do not achieve
the quality necessary to succeed in (international) markets.
                                                
7 In the case of Hungary the fact that only a low share of foreign-owned exporting firms conduct R&D in
Hungary at all is a hint that multinational firms have this view (cf. Havas 2002). Similarly Paasi (2000) reports
that in Estonia the foreign firms have lower R&D intensities than the Estonian ones.
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Table 6: Panel structure
Western Germany
Observed patterns
1994 1996 1998 2000 Freq. Percent Cum.
X 578 28.11 28.11
X 257 12.50 40.61
X 225 10.94 51.56
X 198 9.63 61.19
X X 132 6.42 67.61
X X 111 5.40 73.01




1994 1996 1998 2000 Freq. Percent Cum.
X 161 22.90 22.90
X 110 15.65 38.55
X 71 10.10 48.65
X 58 8.25 56.90
X X 58 8.25 65.15
X X 39 5.55 70.70
other patterns 206 29.30 100.00
Total 703 100.00
Note: Total sample amounts to 3,239 observations in Western Germany and 1,153 in Eastern Germany.
